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FEMINISM UNMODIFIED. By Catherine MacKinnon.1 
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. 315. 
$25.00. 
GENDER AND HISTORY. By Linda J. Nicholson.z New 
York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 238. 
$27.50. 
Michael Levin3 
It is an open secret in the academy that academic feminism is 
held to standards that are considerably more relaxed than those 
governing other forms of scholarship. On the evidence of their pre-
sumably peer-reviewed publications, feminists are not expected to 
marshall evidence for even their most extraordinary claims, to meet 
obvious objections to these claims, to maintain internal consistency, 
or even to express themselves clearly enough for the reader to deter-
mine precisely what it is that they wish to say. In a grand gesture of 
intellectual affirmative action, the predominantly male academic es-
tablishment continues to allow feminists to get away with anything. 
If this indictment seems too harsh, consider the books under 
review, both published by very prestigious university presses. These 
books teach nothing, and their authors seem unaware of any aspect 
of human experience beyond those discussed in Feminist Studies or 
Das Kapital. Each book will be found unreadable by anyone but a 
reviewer, whose duty compels him to press on. The turgidity of 
Professor Linda Nicholson's prose gives new force to the insult 
"written like a dissertation." Here for instance is a passage about 
the slogan "the personal is political": 
The slogan provides, I believe, an important clue to understanding the signifi-
cance of the contemporary women's movement and marks it as unique as a political 
movement. This uniqueness is reflected not only within the political practice. 
Rather I wish to argue, and this will be a central argument of this book, that the 
theory which is currently being developed by those active in the contemporary wo-
men's movement represents a comparably unique contribution to existing political 
theory. The attention contemporary feminist practice has given to gender relations 
and the family is reflected within feminist theory in the study of both as necessary 
components of political theory. The consequence, I intend to show, carries serious 
implications for existing political theory. 
I. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
2. Associate Professor in Women's Studies and Philosophy of Education, State Uni-
versity of New York, Albany. 
3. Professor of Philosophy, City College of New York and the Graduate Center of the 
City University of New York. 
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And here is Professor Nicholson explaining why appeal to 
biology "prevents us from understanding the family in historical 
perspective": 
Such a dehistoricization is fatal for comprehending gender. since it is importantly 
through understanding the history of the family and its relation to nonfamilial insti-
tutions as well as the prehistory of the family in institutions of kinship, that we will 
be able to comprehend that history of gender which has brought us to our present. 
Moreover, such a biologization of the modern family serves to freeze those gender 
relations expressed in it, to conceptualize them also as grounded in biology. 
Professor Catherine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified is not 
lifeless, but its animus against men and heterosexuality will quickly 
tire anyone who does not share MacKinnon's obsessions. There 
was, apparently, no editor at Harvard University Press with the 
gumption to delete her many snarling references to fucking and 
coming,4 or her query, "Who listens to a woman with a penis in her 
mouth?" 
The deference of male academics to feminist excess may be 
partly due to misplaced chivalry and an understandable reluctance 
to provoke further feminist anger, but it derives primarily from 
guilt about the massive oppression supposedly suffered by women. 
Naturally enough, this serviceable idea is the exclusive theme of 
Gender and History and Feminism Unmodified, as it is of every fem-
inist word and thought. 
Professor Nicholson takes the universal oppression of women 
as a given. Without attempting to offer any evidence that women 
are oppressed, she sets out to explain why they are, unconcerned 
that explanations of what isn't so are devoid of interest. If women's 
oppression is wholly or partly a myth, then to that extent Nicholson 
might as well be telling us why the Earth is square or how Napo-
leon won the battle of Waterloo. She obscures this difficulty by 
identifying the oppression of women with "patriarchy," the male's 
predominance in all extrafamilial roles and his traditional role as 
final arbiter within the family. Patriarchy is a fact, and one de-
manding explanation. "Oppression," however, is not the only plau-
sible explanation of patriarchy. If men run most things wholly or 
partly because men on average want to run things more intensely 
than do women-if patriarchy reflects the innate preferences of 
both men and women-then to that extent patriarchy is not oppres-
4. For instance: "I would like to address a question ... : whether a good fuck is any 
compensation for getting fucked"; "Rape is defined by distinction from intercourse--not 
nonviolence, intercourse. They ask, does this event look more like fucking or like rape?"; 
"Abortion offers women the liberal feminist dream of being real women-that is available to 
being freely fucked"; "Women in pornography, when you tickle us, we get turned on; when 
you scratch us, we start to come; when you kill us, we orgasm until death." 
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sive.s (Nicholson further compounds the confusion by identifying 
patriarchy with the "devaluation of women.") 
But Professor Nicholson's most egregious error, one that 
would vitiate her book no matter how meticulous the rest of her 
argument, is her explicit rejection of scientific method. If women 
have been oppressed in every society, it is natural to posit some 
single factor responsible for this universal phenomenon. That simi-
lar effects must be presumed to have similar causes is the guiding 
principle of science. It would be an astonishing coincidence if hun-
dreds of distinct processes all somehow produced the same result, 
male dominance, in each of hundreds of different societies. Yet that 
is precisely what Nicholson would have us accept. In place of "a 
positivist methodology" she offers "the historical-hermeneutical 
tradition," which "rejects that model of scientific explanation which 
searches for similar causes to [sic] similar effects."6 What is to be 
sought instead is the "meaning" of women's oppression in each 
society: 
But, as female devaluation is not one fact but many, interlinked with specificities of 
culture, so also should we abandon the search for one cross-cultural cause .... To 
analyze the origins of female devaluation, we may need to construct more than one 
story. 
At her most adventurous, Nicholson comes close to abandoning the 
idea of causation altogether: "To think about origins historically 
means rejecting the equation of origins with cause."7 
It is unfortunate that Nicholson discusses the causal issue only 
in connection with Marxist efforts to provide a unified explanation 
of sex roles in terms of private property. Since Marxism cannot 
5. People are "oppressed" when forced by others to do what they do not want to do. 
Some feminists allow that women under patriarchy do what they want to do, but claim that 
women are oppressed because their wants are "inauthentic" products of sexist conditioning. 
This view clearly assumes that no preferences, male or female, are innate. Betty Friedan 
concedes that female preferences may have something to do with innate female physiology, 
but argues that if this is so women are oppressed by their own preferences. Such a view 
requires an incoherent distinction between a person and his desires, for it construes a person's 
desires as external forces compelling him to do what he does not want to do. 
6. Despite her animadversions against it, Professor Nicholson appears not to know 
what "positivist methodology" is. Positivism is not especially concerned with Occam's Ra-
zor, linear causation, or determinism (what Professor Nicholson calls "determinacy"). Posi-
tivism is distinguished by its concern that hypotheses be empirically testable. 
7. Nicholson flirts with rejecting "the search for 'origins'" as well, and approvingly 
cites this sentence from Michelle Rosaldo: "But asking 'Why?' or 'How did it begin?' appears 
inevitably to run our thoughts from an account of the significance of gender for the organiza-
tion of all human institutional forms (and, reciprocally, of the significance of all social facts to 
gender) toward dichotomous assumptions that link the roles of men and women to the differ-
ent things that they, as individuals, are apt to do-things which for women in particular, are 
all too readily explained by the apparently primordial and unchanging facts of sexual 
physiology." 
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provide a convincing explanation of anything, Nicholson is able to 
persuade herself that a unified explanation is unimportant. But, to 
repeat, that view is tantamount to a rejection of science. Once one 
seeks a single cause for the anthropological constant of male domi-
nance, it becomes apparent that this cause cannot be a social factor 
unless it is one that somehow arises everywhere and in every era. 
Hunger, for example, is such a factor, but hunger is biological. One 
must therefore consider the possibility of a biological universal of 
some sort-at the very least, the innately greater physical strength 
of men. Feminists recognize this, but they are unwilling to make 
even the most minimal and obvious concessions to the reality of 
innate differences between the sexes. That is why they loathe biol-
ogy as Dracula does the sun. 
The only biological universal Professor Nicholson considers 
even momentarily is motherhood. As she puts it, 
There is nothing itself problematic in the claim that in all human societies women 
bear children. That might be treated equivalently to the claim that in all human 
societies women and men urinate. 8 
Predictably, however, she is not impressed by motherhood. 
If we abstract from our own nuclear family, where individual women are often 
dependent on individual men, to different family forms with different divisions of 
labor, then it is easy to see that a pregnant or lactating woman need be no more 
dependent on a larger social group than any other member of that group. . . . 
[Moreover,] an individual woman could be dependent on other nonchildbearing 
females. 
Even at this absurdly simplistic level, her reasoning is patently 
inadequate. Apart from the silliness of positing "different family 
forms" in a world which has yet to see stable arrangements that do 
not involve pairing mothers with individual men, the fact is that 
women are not as capable of abandoning their children as men are. 
Research on the physiology of bonding has confirmed the common-
sense observation that profound hormonal changes within the 
mother cement her attachment to her newbom.9 In any case, the 
principal biological factors determining social structure are, in addi-
tion to those involving motherhood per se, the great number that 
8. Many other bodily functions, such as breathing, are equally apt for the comparison 
Professor Nicholson wishes to make. A hermeneutical focus on close readings and hidden 
subtexts would doubtless deconstruct Gender and History to reveal deep hostility to mother-
hood, children, and sexual relations between men and women. 
9. See Persky, Reproductive Hormones, Moods, and the Menstrual Cycle, in SEX DIF· 
FERENCES IN BEHAVIOR 455 (R. Friedman, R. Richart & R. Vande Wiele eds. 1974). There 
are obviously good evolutionary reasons for the emergence of bonding mechanisms. It is also 
obvious that professors of Women's Studies should be acquainted with the scientific literature 
on these mechanisms, and that some referee for Columbia University Press should have in-
sisted that Professor Nicholson consult it. 
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produce sex differences in motivation and cognition.w The prenatal 
exposure of the mammalian male brain to androgens alters those 
regions of the brain associated with characteristically male aggres-
sive behavior. Human females exposed to androgens in utero de-
velop masculine personalities rather than the feminine personalities 
associated with female socialization. It is becoming similarly evi-
dent that males enjoy an innate advantage in abstract mathematical 
skills while females enjoy an advantage in verbal skills; recently ob-
served physical differences between the male and female brain, par-
ticularly the greater attenuation of the corpus callosum in adult 
females, seem implicated in these differences. In short, the funda-
mentals of gender are not "socially constructed." History sheds no 
light whatsoever on the male advantage in dominance-aggression, 
although the contingencies of culture obviously influence the spe-
cific manifestations of this and other innate tendencies. When Pro-
fessor Nicholson wanted to know why public affairs are associated 
with men, and thence with "reason," she should have looked to bi-
ology. It was inexcusable for Columbia University Press to publish 
a study of gender and history by an author either ignorant of the 
research described or ideologically committed to ignoring it. 
Perhaps because Nicholson spends so much time saying what 
she is going to say and saying what she has said, her actual 
message-her specific account of what history teaches about gen-
der-is extremely thin. As I understand her, she wishes to deny 
that the family is a "natural" institution which creates a "private" 
sphere that is disjoint from the "public" sphere in every society. 
She contends instead that there have been societies without the fam-
ily; that the family has only recently evolved out of kinship rela-
tions; that, consequently, the line between public and private is an 
"abstraction" not corresponding to any social reality; and finally, 
that relegating women's activities to the "private" sphere mystifies 
"the realities of women's lives," in particular their devaluation. 
Nicholson does not-because she cannot-offer any anthropo-
logical evidence for her astonishing denial of the universality of the 
family. She relies instead upon rhetorical ploys that are as transpar-
ent as they are ubiquitous in feminist writing. One ploy is to confine 
her citations to the writings of other feminists. 11 The second is reli-
ance on the work of Philippe Aries, who Nicholson interprets as 
10. For a discussion of some of this research, see M. LEVI!", FEMINISM AND FREEDOM 
ch. 4 (1987). 
II. "Those who have most explicitly endorsed this position ... [that) the relation be-
tween 'private' and 'public' is historically changing ... have been socialist feminists .... 
Thus much of the theory and scholarship I shall draw on in this book will be from the 
writings of socialist feminists." 
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maintaining "that the concept of the family was unknown in the 
Middle Ages and only originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies." Of course, it turns out that Aries maintains no such thing; 
his point, rather, is that "the family existed in silence; it did not 
awaken feelings strong enough to inspire poet or artist." Whether 
this is or is not so-and Aries seems not to know that the Holy 
Family was a dominant theme in medieval art-it hardly implies 
that there were no families. Third, Nicholson stresses the distinc-
tion between the biologically fixed but quite extensive network of 
kinship relations, and the more specific triad of mother, father, and 
child. This enables her to gloss over the fact that the reproductive 
triad forms the biological and social backbone of any more exten-
sive kinship structure. No matter how many sisters and cousins and 
aunts are reckoned up, the identity of the mother and father of a 
child is always firm, and it is upon them that primary responsibility 
for raising the child has always fallen in every society. A fourth and 
related tactic is to stress historical variations in family arrangements 
as if they nullify perennial constancies. The contemporary urban 
apartment, miles from the father's workplace and seldom accom-
modating grandparents or aunts, differs greatly from a medieval 
farmhouse. Yet mother and father were as clearly recognized in the 
farmhouse as they are in the apartment. 
Both of our authors use a disarming ploy which might be 
called "refutation by explicit statement." It involves creating the 
impression that a devastating objection has been answered by stat-
ing the objection clearly and then moving on. Nicholson deploys 
this device most boldly against Locke's contention that the state 
cannot be justified by analogy to the family because the family and 
the state serve different functions. She begins by paraphrasing 
Locke's point fairly: 
Since the early modern period it has been widely believed that the needs which 
motivate individuals to become members of families are of a fundamentally different 
nature from the needs which motivate families to unite into states. The basic 
human needs which have been thought to motivate the creation of families typically 
include intimacy, affection, sexuality, and mutual care and support. 
If Locke is right, of course, the distinction between family and state 
is decidedly natural. Nicholson rejects this view, yet makes no ef-
fort to rebut it. Perhaps she believes its naked sexism suffices to 
repel right-minded readers. Perhaps she hopes to bluff the reader. 
In any event, what follows is an astonishing discussion of Locke's 
criticism of Robert Filmer, who defended the divine right of kings. 
Professor Nicholson does not quite side with Filmer against Locke, 
but she finds Filmer's comparison of kings with fathers to be sensi-
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tive to "the unity of kinship and politics." Filmer erred, according 
to Nicholson, only in anachronistically projecting this union, which 
was "once real" (before "lords had become replaced by fathers and 
kings"), into modern times. Locke did much more damage by 
blindly "reifying" state and family, time-bound features of his own 
era, thus "eliminat[ing] appeals to the past as relevant for political 
analysis." This is why "radical feminism might be seen as the con-
temporary rejoinder to a view of social organization first impor-
tantly articulated by Locke." You have to go pretty far in 1987 to 
find a sympathetic word for the divine right of kings, but it's there 
in Gender and History. 
Of course, Locke's liberalism is anathema to feminists. Femi-
nist social reforms require a totalitarian invasion of private life by 
the coercive agency of the state. As Professor Nicholson delicately 
puts it, even mild, moderate "liberal" feminism will require "a re-
structuring of the public." 12 This invasion becomes more tolerable, 
of course, if one is convinced that there really is no private sphere to 
begin with. Moreover, since sex roles are most strongly reinforced 
within the family, admitting that the family is a realm of autonomy 
amounts to admitting that sex roles reflect basic human preferences, 
an admission spelling the end of feminist ideology. Joining an 
overly broad definition of politics as the allocation of power to their 
axiom that private life is a male excuse for overpowering women, 
feminists naturally consider private life "political." 
Animosity toward individual freedom reaches pathological in-
tensity in Feminism Unmodified. Mere mention of the Bill of 
Rights is enough to drive Professor MacKinnon into a fury: 
The theory of the First Amendment under which most pornography is pro-
tected from government restriction proceeds from liberal assumptions that do not 
apply to the situation of women. First Amendment theory, like virtually all liberal 
legal theory, presumes the validity of the distinction between public and private 
. . . . The problem is that not only the public but also the private is a "sphere of 
social power" of sexism. . . . The distinction between public and private does not 
cut the same for women as for men. It is men's right to inflict pornography upon 
women in private that is protected. 
And not just pornography. There is also rape, wife-beating, and 
assault on children. In Professor MacKinnon's world, 44% of all 
women are victims of rape or attempted rape, "not counting in their 
marriage"; 14% of married women have been raped by their hus-
bands; 92.2% of all women are sexually assaulted or harassed; any-
where from 25% to 70% of women experience serious violence in 
12. That feminism is necessarily coercive and totalitarian is the central theme of my 
FEMINISM AND FREEDOM. 
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the home; 48% of children are sexually assaulted; 17.5% of all fe-
males under 18 suffer incest at the hands of male family members. 
All men think like rapists: "Recent experimental research . . . 
makes normal men more closely resemble convicted rapists atti-
tudinally, although as a group they don't look all that different from 
them to start with."B Even Roe v. Wade is part of the problem. 
Roe may have saved women from a "desperate situation," namely 
pregnancy as a result of "intercourse under conditions of gender 
inequality,"'4 but 
When the law of privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars change in 
control over that intimacy. The existing distribution of power and resources within 
the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy exists to protect. It is 
probably not coincidence that the very things feminism regards as central to the 
subjection of women-the very place, the body; the very relations, heterosexual; the 
very activities, intercourse and reproduction; and the very feelings, intimate-form 
the core of what is covered by privacy doctrine. From this perspective, the legal 
concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and 
women's exploited labor . . . . This right to privacy is a right of men "to be let 
alone" to oppress women one at a time. 
No wonder Professor MacKinnon cries that "the family legitimizes 
violence to women and calls that civilization." 
MacKinnon's hysteria might be understandable if her statistics 
were trustworthy, but in fact they are suspect. Her avalanche of 
footnotes notwithstanding, MacKinnon gets most of her figures 
from a single source-a survey by Diana Russell of 930 San Fran-
cisco households. Russell maintains that 44% of the females in 
these households had been raped or attacked with intent to rape, 
and that 14% of the married women reported being raped by their 
husbands. One may judge the reliability of these numbers by recal-
ling that in 1976 Russell convened a tribunal on "crimes against 
women" modelled on the Nuremberg trials. Russell's sexual assault 
figure was "produced at my [Professor MacKinnon's] request from 
[the same] random sample." Sexual assault was defined to cover 
"all the forms of rape or other sexual abuse or harassment surveyed, 
noncontact as well as contact, from gang rape by strangers to ob-
scene phone calls [to] unwanted sexual advances on the street." 
Not long ago a man attempted to strike up a conversation with my 
wife as she was browsing at a bookstall: chalk up another sexual 
assault!' 5 
13. There is one ray of hope: Professor MacKinnon reports being hissed at upon mak· 
ing this statement during a lecture at the Harvard University Law School. 
14. MacKinnon reminds us that, "Sexual intercourse [is] still the most common cause 
of pregnancy." 
15. The statistic about prostitution comes from Griffin, Wives, Hookers and the Law, 
STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 1982, at 18. 
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Now one might be tempted to attribute all this rape to men 
wanting sex more than women wish to give it to them, but for Pro-
fessor MacKinnon this is at best a half-truth. To be sure, women 
dislike sex with men; MacKinnon's paradigm of sex as experienced 
by women is the bored prostitute faking pleasure. (She reluctantly 
allows that some women do enjoy sex with men, but only because 
sex is degrading and these women have learned to enjoy degrada-
tion.) Yet MacKinnon also appears to believe that men don't like 
sex very much, either. They certainly have no innate desire for it: 
Desire ... is taken for a natural essence or presocial impetus but it is actually 
created by the social relations, the hierarchical relations in question. This process 
creates the social beings we know as women and men. 
Under patriarchy, dominance is "erotized" (or "eroticized").t6 
What men really want is control over women, and the penis is their 
cattle prod: 
I think that when men sexually harass women it expresses male control over sexual 
access to us. It doesn't mean they all want to fuck us, they just want to hurt us, 
dominate us, and control us, and that is fucking us. 
In Professor MacKinnon's terminology, men don't oppress women 
in order to fuck them; they fuck women in order to oppress them. 
Quite apart from MacKinnon's evident unfamiliarity with nor-
mal human beings, there is a logical problem here. Obviously, a 
stimulus not unconditionally arousing becomes "eroticized" by as-
sociation with a stimulus that is unconditionally arousing. A night-
gown is "eroticized" for a man by its association with his wife. 
Therefore, if there are no unconditional arousers, if all desire is "so-
cially constructed," no stimuli can be conditionally arousing. If sex 
is not sexy, where is anything else to get its sexiness from? 
Professor MacKinnon's answer, in case you have not guessed, 
is pornography. Before turning to that topic, however, it is impor-
tant to emphasize the extremism of her denial of innate determi-
nants of relations between the sexes. At several points she seems to 
deny even innate physical differences between men and women; at 
any rate, she clearly asserts that, absent domination, nobody would 
notice whatever differences there are: 
Differences between the sexes do descriptively exist: being a doormat is definitely 
different from being a man .... Differences are inequality's post-hoc excuse ... , the 
distinctions that perception is socially organized to notice because inequality gives 
them consequences for social power. 
Gender might not even code as difference, might not mean distinction epistemologi-
cally, were it not for its consequences for social power. 
16. She equates "this erotization of dominance and submission" with heterosexuality. 
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[G)ender is an inequality first, constructed as socially relevant differentiation in or-
der to keep that inequality in place. 
Another way to say that is, there would be no such thing as what we know as the 
sex difference ... were it not for male dominance. Sometimes people ask me "Does 
that mean you think there's no difference between women and men?" The only way 
I know how to answer that is: of course there is; the difference is that men have 
power and women do not.l7 
Professor MacKinnon again faces a logical dilemma. If "male" is 
"a social and political concept, not a biological concept," how do 
men know whom to oppress before their victims have actually been 
oppressed and thereby become female? How, indeed, does a man 
know he is one of the lucky oppressors before he has begun to do 
any oppressing and thereby become male? Not by looking between 
his legs, since "epistemologically, gender is socially controlled." 
Unless Professor MacKinnon believes that penis and vagina are il-
lusions fostered by dominance and submission, she must be saying 
that by coincidence most of the oppressors in every society happen 
to possess penises, and for this purely fortuitous reason possession 
of a penis is widely thought to reveal something about the kind of 
person that the possessor is. It is quite a coincidence, and one 
which leaves unexplained why the human race divided itself into 
dominators and submittors in the first place. Where did the "social 
construct" come from that enabled men to establish all the social 
constructs? 
Viewing male dominance as the organizing principle of society, 
Professor MacKinnon is quick to scorn the spurious sexual equality 
offered by civil rights legislation. Purportedly sex-neutral standards 
are always advantageous to men because male "experiences and ob-
sessions define merit." As one might suspect, she has quite a bit 
more trouble explaining why affirmative action rules that favor 
women over men also perpetuate male dominance. She has so 
much trouble, in fact, that she resorts to a variant of refutation by 
explicit statement, namely explicit statement followed by obscure 
irrelevancy: 
Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule 
is simply the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is 
the referent for both. Think about it like those anatomy models in medical school. 
A male body is the human body; all those extra things women have are studied in 
ob/gyn. It truly is a situation in which more is less. 
The same technique assists in addressing another unavoidable 
problem for advocates of sex equality: does equality entail female 
17. This is an excellent example of refutation by explicit statement. 
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conscription, and would the proposed Equal Rights Amendment 
mandate it? She answers: 
Sometimes I see this as a dialogue between women in the afterlife. The feminist 
says to the soldier, "We fought for your equality." The soldier says to the feminist, 
"oh, no, we fought for your equality." 
Yes, but does sex equality entail female conscription, and would the 
ERA require it? 
But here is an amazing thing. After rejecting the institutions of 
patriarchy and exposing affirmative action for women as another 
patriarchal plot, MacKinnon goes ahead and endorses numerical 
goals anyway. She lauds the Supreme Court's approval of legisla-
tion "to remove barriers to economic advancement and political 
and social integration that have historically plagued ... women." 
Although "feminism means to transform the meaning of athletics, 
of sport itself," nonetheless "Title IX has been extremely impor-
tant" for facilitating girls-only teams which exclude athletically su-
perior boys. Legal careers impose male standards on women, and 
"the real feminist issue is not whether biological females hold posi-
tions of power," yet "it is utterly essential that women be there." 
Consistency gets short shrift when it gets in the way of discrimina-
tion against men. 
As previously mentioned, Professor MacKinnon's primum mo-
bile, the organizing principle "central to the institution of male 
dominance," is pornography. Despite her inability to explain how 
pictures of submissive women could arouse anyone not already 
aroused by female submissiveness, or why patriarchy antedates and 
extends beyond pornography,'s she endows pornography with near-
omnipotence. Pornography, along with rape and prostitution, "in-
stitutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy"; it "conditions 
male orgasm to female subordination"; it "target[s] survivors" of 
rape and domestic battering; it "is used to break women, to train 
women to sexual submission, to season women, to terrorize women, 
and to silence their dissent." And so on for 150 pages. 
While one expects this philippic to end with a call for drawing 
and quartering-or perhaps some more fitting dismemberment-of 
those involved with pornography, Professor MacKinnon merely 
urges that pornography be made illegal. Since pornography liter-
18. She explicitly states the latter objection. Among the ensuing obscure irrelevancies 
are anti-Semitism before the Third Reich and white racism where there is no Ku Klux Klan. 
The discussion then shifts to whether anti-Semitism is worth fighting, Nazis or no Nazis, with 
the implicit equation of tolerance for pornography and tolerance for anti-Semitism. Her ex-
amples, however, actually underscore the force of the objection: since anti-Semitism has ex-
isted without Nazis, Nazism cannot be necessary for anti-Semitism-just as pornography 
cannot be necessary for male dominance. 
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ally "undermines sex equality," it violates women's civil rights, and 
traffic in pornography should create the same civil liability as any 
other Title VII violation. Unfortunately, "first amendment fetish-
ists" have impeded legal reform. MacKinnon is particularly exas-
perated by a federal court's rejection of anti-pornography legislation 
that she helped draft for the City of Minneapolis, a holding summa-
rily affirmed by the Supreme Court. She bitterly contrasts the situa-
tion in the U.S. with that in Nicaragua, where it is illegal to "use 
women as sexual or commercial objects." Her discussion of the 
Sexual Politics of the First Amendment ends with the reminder that 
"serious movements for human freedom" never tolerate "the so-
called speech of the other side." An interesting sentiment from a 
woman who taught Constitutional Law at Minnesota Law School, 
was selected as a distinguished guest lecturer on civil liberty at 
Harvard Law, and was chosen to be a visiting professor at Chicago 
Law and next year Yale Law. 
Given the length of her harangue, it is curious that Professor 
MacKinnon never gets around to mentioning just what the courts 
found objectionable about the feminist pornography ordinance. 
The sticking point, in fact, was its language banning "the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in words or pic-
tures."J9 One need come nowhere near the more difficult free 
speech (and pornography) issues to agree with the courts that, con-
trary to the first amendment's clear purpose of forbidding govern-
ment sanction of opinions, this language would establish an official, 
approved view of women. 
If pornography is an idea, what do we do with works of art and 
literature that express evil ideas? Picasso's Tauromachea drawings 
certainly run afoul of Professor MacKinnon's proscriptions. So 
might the character of Stanley Kowalski in A Streetcar Named De-
sire. One need not look even this far for hard cases: ironically, the 
most popular literary genre that would be vulnerable to MacKin-
non's ordinance is the soft-core "bodice-ripper" paperback that 
bores men but titillates millions of women. In the typical bodice-
ripper, a handsome rake-a renegade nobleman, a riverboat gam-
bler, a pirate-enters a woman's life and takes her, ignoring her 
19. The cited condition is necessary but not sufficient; it only becomes sufficient when 
adjoined to one or more of several further conditions, including the representation of women 
in "postures of sexual submission," or in ways which "reduce" them to their breasts and 
vaginas. A representation is also considered pornographic if it uses "men, children or 
transsexuals in the place of women." So even representations which on Professor MacKin-
non's grounds should be conceived as conditioning an ideology of male (or children's or 
transsexual's) subordination turn out to be designed to subordinate women. One is reminded 
of the paranoid's reply, when it is pointed out to him that there seems to be nobody plotting 
against him, "Ah, that just shows how cleverly they're plotting." 
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objections. She resists, but her body betrays her. She enjoys it in 
fairly explicit terms. After many adventures in exotic settings, they 
marry.2o 
As the philsopher Christopher Boorse has observed, art raises 
logical questions as well. Do words or pictures perform actions, 
like subordinating women and reducing them to their breasts and 
vaginas?21 Does a film of a couple climaxing in the missionary posi-
tion advocate the missionary position, or espouse the general thesis 
that most women are more likely to climax when the man is on top? 
And what of books which explicitly defend the subordination of wo-
men? Perhaps it is not fully realized that ideational definitions of 
pornography threaten the literal expression of ideas. Many students 
of human behavior, most notably Freud, have held that women are 
happier when they submit sexually to men. The sociologist Steven 
Goldberg argues in The Inevitability of Patriarchy that male domi-
nance is biologically inevitable, and counsels acceptance of that re-
ality. My own Feminism and Freedom maintains that male 
dominance can only be prevented (and then just temporarily and 
locally) by the machinery of a totalitarian state. To develop these 
positions, it is sometimes necessary to discuss orgasm, clitoral mas-
sage, penile penetration of the vagina and other sexual matters in 
explicit detail. So far as I can tell, publication of these works would 
be illegal in Professor MacKinnon's world. It is no accident, as a 
Marxist would say, that she is a Marxist-albeit an anti-heterosex-
ual Marxist. 
To the limited extent that MacKinnon's rage has an intellec-
tual basis, it rests on a confusion between a representation of a thing 
and a thing itself. She repeatedly describes pornography as some-
thing done to women, rather than pictures or descriptions of actions 
done to notional women. Pornography for MacKinnon is not fan-
tasy "but sexual reality: the level of reality on which sex itself 
largely operates." It is no wonder that she complains that you can 
be legally liable for destroying a cup, a physical object, if it is some-
one's property, but you aren't liable for destroying women by mak-
ing a pornographic movie. She is so obsessively enraged at male 
sexual desire that she is functionally unaware that men reading 
20. Evolutionary biology sees the differences between male and female sexual fantasies 
as an extension of adaptive differences in sexual behavior. Since a man does best (from his 
genes' point of view) by mating with as many women as possible, he is strongly cued by sheer 
receptiveness. Since a woman does best (from her genes' point of view) by mating with a man 
both strong enough to protect her and her offspring and devoted enough not to leave her, she 
is strongly cued by males who might "sweep her off her feet." Were I to be more explicit 
about the sexually differentiated mechanisms of arousal, this paragraph would have to be 
censored under MacKinnon's criteria. 
21. See supra note 19. 
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Penthouse are imagining themselves having intercourse, and not re-
ally having intercourse at all. 
Despite the many passages I have quoted from Feminism Un-
modified, I fear I may not have adequately recreated the aura of 
dementia radiating from this book. I have long suspected that femi-
nism has gotten as far as it has because people simply do not read 
the ipsissimae dixeunt of feminists themselves. So I will close by 
leaving the reader with the quintessence of the MacKinnon 
sensibility: 
To be about to be raped is to be gender female in the process of going about life as 
usual. 
[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means 
to guarantee male power as a system. 
And now my favorite (no easy decision). As the reader ponders it, 
he might reflect that the book from which it is drawn was lauded in 
the New York Times, and that feminism, unmodified, continues to 
be embraced by a wide segment of the legal, academic, and intellec-
tual community: 
Playboy's articles push their views, including their views of the First Amendment, 
in an expressly sexualized context, and at the same time those articles serve to legiti-
mize what their pictures do to women. Masturbating over the positions taken by 
the women's bodies associates male orgasm with the positions expressed in the arti-
cles. Ever wonder why men are so passionate about the First Amendment? . . . I 
must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years 
of absolutist writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know 
those superheated articles where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent 
repression is invoked. Behaviorally, Playboy's consumers are reading about the 
First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amend-
ment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, mastur-
bating to the women. 
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